Operation Catapult Part 1
The story of Churchill's Darkest Decision and the Destruction of the French Fleet
The summer of 1940 found Britain standing alone against the Nazi war machine, her continental allies either conquered or capitulating. The fall of France in June 1940 presented Winston Churchill's War Cabinet with a strategic nightmare that would test the limits of Anglo-French relations and force Britain into one of the most controversial naval actions in her history. Operation Catapult, launched on 3 July 1940, represented the grim calculus of total war, where former allies became potential threats and desperate measures became necessary for survival.
The genesis of this operation lay not in malice or imperial ambition, but in the cold reality of naval mathematics. In 1940, the French fleet was the fourth largest naval force in the world after Britain, the United States and Japan. This formidable force comprised seven battleships, 19 cruisers, 71 destroyers and 76 submarines, representing a naval power that could dramatically alter the balance of forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean.
The French Armistice with Germany, signed on 22 June 1940, contained provisions regarding the disposal of the French Navy that did little to assuage British concerns. Article VIII of the armistice stated that the French fleet would be concentrated in specified ports and demobilised under German or Italian control. Whilst the Germans promised that they would not use the French fleet for their own purposes, such assurances rang hollow to a British government that had witnessed the systematic breaking of German promises throughout the 1930s.
Churchill himself articulated the British position with characteristic bluntness: the French fleet must not fall into German hands. The implications were stark. Should the Kriegsmarine gain control of French naval assets, the Royal Navy's already tenuous grip on Atlantic sea lanes would be broken. German access to French Atlantic ports, combined with the addition of modern French battleships, cruisers, and destroyers to their fleet, could prove decisive in the Battle of the Atlantic.
The British made a contingency plan, Operation Catapult, to eliminate the French fleet in mid-June, when it was clear that Philippe Pétain was forming a government with a view to ending the war and it seemed likely that the French fleet might be seized by the Germans. This planning represented a remarkable feat of strategic foresight, prepared even as the Battle of France still raged and before the armistice was signed.
The Admiralty's assessment of French naval dispositions revealed a complex challenge. French warships were scattered across multiple locations, from home ports in metropolitan France to naval bases throughout the Mediterranean and French colonial empire. The largest concentration of modern French capital ships lay at Mers-el-Kébir, the naval base adjacent to Oran in French Algeria. Here, Admiral Marcel-Bruno Gensoul commanded Force de Raid, including the modern battlecruiser Dunkerque, her sister ship Strasbourg, and the older battleships Provence and Bretagne.
At Alexandria, Admiral René-Émile Godfroy commanded Force X, a significant squadron including the modern battleship Lorraine, three heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, three destroyers, and one submarine. Meanwhile, scattered across British ports were numerous French vessels that had sought refuge during the German offensive or had been engaged in joint operations with the Royal Navy.
The British intelligence picture was complicated by uncertainty regarding French intentions. While some French naval officers had expressed private reservations about the armistice terms, the official position of the French Admiralty remained one of compliance with the new Vichy government. Admiral François Darlan, the French Minister of Marine, had reportedly given assurances that the fleet would never be surrendered to Germany, but such promises could not be guaranteed given the pressures the Vichy regime faced.
The planning for Operation Catapult required meticulous coordination across multiple theatres. The operation would need to be executed simultaneously to prevent any French force from escaping to warn others. Three main components emerged: the seizure of French ships in British ports (codenamed Operation Grasp), the neutralisation of the squadron at Alexandria through negotiation or force, and the destruction of the Mers-el-Kébir squadron should diplomatic efforts fail.
Before resorting to force, the British government made several attempts to resolve the matter diplomatically. On 1 July, the British Ambassador to France, Sir Ronald Campbell, met with Admiral Darlan to discuss the future of the French fleet. Darlan reiterated his promise that the fleet would be scuttled rather than allowed to fall into German hands, but could offer no concrete guarantees that satisfied British concerns.
The British position was that French adherence to the armistice terms effectively placed the fleet under Axis control, regardless of current German promises. The precedent of German treaty violations, from the Rhineland to Poland, suggested that such promises were worthless when they conflicted with German strategic interests. Moreover, the British argued, the rapid collapse of French resistance demonstrated that good intentions might prove insufficient in the face of German pressure or a potential change in the Vichy government's composition.
Churchill's government faced intense pressure from multiple quarters. The Dominions, particularly Canada and Australia, pressed for decisive action to ensure that the French fleet could not threaten vital shipping routes. The United States, whilst officially neutral, watched British actions closely as an indicator of Britain's resolve to continue the fight. Failure to neutralise the French naval threat could undermine American confidence in Britain's chances of survival, potentially affecting future material support.
Domestically, public opinion was divided but generally supportive of strong measures. The trauma of Dunkirk and the apparent collapse of French resistance had hardened British attitudes towards their former ally. Many Britons viewed the French armistice as a betrayal, and there was little sympathy for French protestations about sovereignty or honour when British survival was at stake.
The naval forces allocated to Operation Catapult reflected both the scale of the undertaking and the stretched resources of the Royal Navy in the summer of 1940. Vice-Admiral James Somerville was appointed to command the newly formed Force H, based at Gibraltar. This force, created specifically for Operation Catapult, would become one of the Royal Navy's most important strategic reserves throughout the war.
Force H comprised the battlecruiser HMS Hood, the battleships HMS Valiant and HMS Resolution, the aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal, two light cruisers (HMS Arethusa and HMS Enterprise), and eleven destroyers. HMS Hood, as the flagship, carried particular symbolic weight. Hood served as the flagship of Force H and, as a symbol of British naval power throughout the interwar period, her participation in Operation Catapult represented both the seriousness of the British intent and the tragic irony of using the Navy's most celebrated ship against former allies.
The selection of HMS Hood for this operation was not merely symbolic. Her 15-inch guns provided the hitting power necessary to neutralise modern French capital ships, whilst her speed advantage over older French battleships could prove crucial should any vessels attempt to escape. However, the assignment also carried risks, as Hood's magazine arrangements and deck armour, whilst adequate against most opponents, had certain vulnerabilities that subsequent events would tragically reveal.
At Alexandria, Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham commanded the Mediterranean Fleet. Cunningham faced a particularly delicate situation, as his ships shared the harbour with the French squadron and had developed professional relationships with their French counterparts during months of cooperation. The prospect of turning guns on former allies in the confined waters of Alexandria harbour presented both tactical and diplomatic challenges.
In British home ports, the task fell to local naval commanders and the Royal Marines. The operation required careful coordination to ensure simultaneous action across multiple locations whilst maintaining operational security. The element of surprise was crucial, as any premature action could alert other French forces and complicate the broader operation.
The French naval presence in British ports represented both an opportunity and a challenge for Operation Catapult planners. More than 200 French vessels in British ports, most of them anchored at Portsmouth and Plymouth, were impounded. The ships included the battleships Courbet and Paris, the supply ship Pollux, destroyers, minelayers, minesweepers, submarines, submarine chasers, motor torpedo boats, and various auxiliary vessels.
These ships had arrived in British ports under various circumstances. Some had been engaged in joint operations with the Royal Navy, others had sought refuge from German advances, and still others had been undergoing repairs or refit in British yards. The crews, totalling several thousand French sailors, presented a complex challenge for British authorities.
The planning for the seizure required detailed intelligence on each vessel's complement, armament, and readiness state. Many of the ships were only partially manned, with some crew members having already departed for France or been dispersed to other duties. However, several vessels retained sufficient crew to offer resistance should they choose to do so.
The Royal Marines were tasked with the actual boarding operations, supported by naval personnel and, where necessary, army units. Each target vessel was assigned a specific boarding party with detailed plans for overcoming resistance and securing sensitive areas such as magazines, engine rooms, and communication centres. The goal was to achieve surprise and overwhelming force to minimise casualties on both sides.
Security considerations were paramount. The operation had to be planned and prepared without alerting French personnel or compromising the broader objectives of Operation Catapult. This required compartmentalisation of information and careful management of normal harbour activities to avoid suspicion.
Operation Catapult began in the early hours of 3 July 1940 with the simultaneous seizure of French vessels in British ports. The operation commenced at 0300 hours, chosen to coincide with the period of minimum alertness among the French crews and to provide maximum time for securing the ships before news of the action could spread.
At Portsmouth, the operation began with the boarding of the old battleship Paris, which had been undergoing refit. The Royal Marine boarding party encountered minimal resistance, as most of the crew was ashore and those remaining were unprepared for hostile action. The ship was secured within thirty minutes, with the French officers placed under guard and the crew confined to quarters under Marine supervision.
The battleship Courbet, also at Portsmouth, presented a more complex challenge. As a vessel still technically in commission, she retained a larger crew complement and more organised command structure. However, the boarding party's swift action and overwhelming numbers ensured that resistance was brief and ineffective. The French captain, Capitaine de Vaisseau Trolley de Prévaux, formally protested the violation of French sovereignty but complied with British demands to avoid bloodshed.
At Plymouth, similar scenes unfolded as Royal Marines boarded destroyers, submarines, and auxiliary vessels. The destroyer Léopard attempted to slip her moorings but was quickly surrounded by British motor launches and forced to surrender. Her captain, recognising the futility of resistance, ordered his crew to comply with British demands.
The submarine Surcouf, one of the largest submarines in the world, presented particular challenges. Her crew initially resisted boarding, resulting in a brief firefight that left three dead (two British officers and one French sailor) and several wounded. However, the submarine was ultimately secured, though not without demonstrating the potential for more serious bloodshed had other crews chosen to resist.
Throughout the night, the pattern repeated across multiple ports. The French crews, caught completely off guard, generally complied with British demands once the futility of resistance became apparent. Many French officers expressed bewilderment and anger at the British action, viewing it as a betrayal of alliance obligations and naval honour.
The completion of the seizure operations in British ports marked the first phase of Operation Catapult, but the full implications would only become clear as news spread of simultaneous actions at Mers-el-Kébir and Alexandria. The French government's reaction was swift and predictably hostile. Admiral Darlan issued orders for French forces to defend themselves against further British attacks, whilst Marshal Pétain personally protested the British action as an act of aggression against a nation that had been Britain's ally.
The French crews detained in British ports became unwilling pawns in a larger diplomatic and strategic game. Many requested repatriation to France, whilst others, particularly among the junior officers and sailors, began to contemplate whether their future lay with the Free French movement being organised by General Charles de Gaulle in London.
The British government justified the action as a necessary measure for national survival. Churchill, in a speech to Parliament, argued that the seizure of French ships in British ports was preferable to their potential use against British interests. The alternative, he suggested, was to allow vessels that could threaten British shipping to return to French ports where they might fall under German control.
The success of the port seizures provided operational security for the more dangerous phases of Operation Catapult. With French vessels in British ports secured and their crews detained, there was no risk of intelligence about British intentions reaching French forces elsewhere. This security proved crucial for the subsequent operations at Mers-el-Kébir and Alexandria.
However, the psychological impact of the seizures extended beyond their immediate tactical value. For many French naval personnel, both those directly affected and those serving elsewhere, the British action represented a fundamental breach of trust. The professional relationships built up through months of cooperation in the early phases of the war were shattered in a single night. This damage would complicate subsequent efforts to rally French naval forces to the Free French cause and would influence French naval attitudes towards Britain for years to come.
The seizure of French ships in British ports thus marked not just the beginning of Operation Catapult, but also the end of the Anglo-French naval alliance that had been a cornerstone of both nations' strategic planning. What followed at Mers-el-Kébir and Alexandria would determine whether this break would lead to French naval forces joining the German war effort or remaining neutral, but the events of 3 July in British ports had already fundamentally altered the strategic balance in the Atlantic and Mediterranean theatres.
As dawn broke on 3 July 1940, the first phase of Operation Catapult was complete. The French Tricolour no longer flew over any warship in a British port, replaced by the White Ensign of the Royal Navy or the guard flags indicating captured vessels. The success of this operation would prove crucial for the more challenging and dangerous phases that were about to unfold in the Mediterranean, where the main French battle fleet waited at anchor, unaware of the storm that was about to break upon them.